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DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL LAW: 2005
BY TIMOTHY H. EVERETT*
In the winter and spring of 2005 the central topic in crim-
inal law in the Bar and in public discourse was the Michael
Ross case. Before Mr. Ross's execution on May 13, 2005;
there had not been an execution in Connecticut since 1960.1
The attention of the Bar and the public was now drawn to the
difference between debating capital punishment and actually
imposing it. The previous debates on capital punishment had
occurred politically and philosophically, sporadically and
abstractly. But now startling events awakened the entire state
to the imminent reality of Ross's execution. 2
To function according to its constitutional and common law
design, the criminal law depends on a trial and appellate
process that is adversarial, not congenial. After multiple trial
and appellate proceedings in his case over two decades, Ross
had no interest in authorizing further adversarial testing of the
legality of his death sentence. His personal decision unified the
prosecution and Ross together against would-be "interested
parties" who opposed his decision and feared its implications
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
I The last person executed in Connecticut before Michael Ross was Joseph
Taborsky in 1960. The Connecticut State Law Library web-site contains a number
of useful legal and historical materials on capital punishment in Connecticut histo-
ry, including a list of the executions in Connecticut since 1894. See
http://www.cslib.org/capitalpunishment.htm.
2-Of course, the courts, prosecutors and defense counsel who had dedicated
years of labor to the Michael Ross case had already long anderstood the extremely
difficult issues of fairness and justice and finality that a capital case poses. The
defendant's underlying capital convictions were affirmed in 1994, at which time the
Supreme Court found error in the penalty phase of the trial and ordered a new sen-
tencing hearing. State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 (1994), cert. denied, Ross v.
Connecticut, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995). The defen-
dant's appeal after the new penalty hearing again resulted in multiple sentences of
death and was denied by the Supreme Court on June 1, 2004. State v. Ross, 269
Conn. 213 (2004). The public defender's office's first efforts to override Ross's
decision to abandon further challenges to the judgment was heard and decided expe-
ditiously in December, 2004, and January, 2005. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577
(2005) (on Dec. 1, 2004 trial court denied public defender office's motion for "next
friend" status under Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 135 (1990); on Jan. 14, 2005 Supreme Court affirmed, finding Ross not
shown to be incompetent to appear in court and make his own decisions).
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for capital punishment in Connecticut. There followed a blitz
of state and federal legal challenges to Ross's competence in
choosing to terminate post-conviction challenges in his name. 3
This article cannot do justice to the legal issues and the stal-
wart efforts of all the jurists, lawyers and others who exhaust-
ed their professional and personal energies in fulfilling their
allotted roles in the case. The narrative of the Ross case needs
to be fully chronicled and sufficiently reflected upon, but not
here. The purpose of this year in review article is to direct the
reader to a goodly number of the more interesting and impor-
tant cases decided in Connecticut criminal law in 2005.
A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The biggest decision of the year in search and seizure law
was State v. Brunetti,4 a murder case raising the question
whether the police may search a home when one occupant
gives his consent to do so in the presence of another occupant
who withholds her consent.5 By a split (3-2) decision, the
3 See, e.g., In re Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Dan Ross and Office
of the Chief Public Defender [as next friend on behalf of Michael B. Ross], 272
Conn. 653,655-61 (2005); Dec. 27, 2004 habeas petitions by defendant's father and
public defender office challenging Ross's competence to waive further post-convic-
tion review; heard by trial court on Jan. 3, 2005 and dismissed; appeals taken Jan.
18, 2005, appeals argued Jan. 21, 2005 and decided by Jan. 25, 2005 affirmance on
grounds that res judicata barred relitigation of challenge to Ross's competence to
make decision, thus undermining "next friend" standing to proceed in lieu of Ross
under Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135
(1990)), aff'd, 272 Conn. 676; Missionary Society of Connecticut v. Board of
Pardons & Paroles, 272 Conn. 647 (2005) (Jan. 4, 2005 petition for commutation of
Ross's death sentences rejected by Board of Pardons and Paroles, appeal to Superior
Court dismissed for lack of standing; Chief Justice granted expedited appeal under
CONN. GEN. STAT. Section 52-265a; appeal argued Jan. 22, 2005 and dismissal
affirmed in decision issued Jan. 24, 2005); Dan Ross v. M. Jodi Rell, 392 F. Supp.
224 (Jan. 10, 2005) (father's motion to proceed as next friend in Section 1983 chal-
lenge to lethal injection method of execution denied); Ross v. Lantz, 2005 US. Dist.
LEXIS 908 (Jan. 25, 2005) (Conn. Dist. Court) (granted Chief Public Defender
Office next friend status to pursue federal writ of habeas corpus, ordered hearing on
Ross's competence, and ordered stay of Ross's execution set for Jan. 26, 2005);
appeal and motion to vacate stay denied, 396. F.3d 512 (Jan. 25, 2005); application
to vacate stay of execution granted, 543 U.S. 1134, 125 S. Ct. 1117, 160 L. Ed. 2d
1091 (Jan. 27, 2005) (by 5-4 vote); State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684 (May 9, 2005)
(reviewing legal events beginning in late January, 2005, involving possible conflict
of interest on part of attorney assisting Ross in seeking execution and culminating
in state trial court's appointment of special counsel to investigate and present evi-
dence of Ross's incompetence).
4 276 Conn. 40 (2005)
5 The disharmonious owners were the father and mother of the murder suspect,
Nicholas Brunetti, who lived with them. Both parents were in the waiting room at
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court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's
motion to suppress because the police may not act on the con-
sent to search a home if two co-occupants are at odds, with one
consenting and the other refusing consent. 6 At this writing,
the case is undergoing reconsideration en banc, with Justice
Borden and Judge Lavery joining the original panel of five
made up of Chief Justice Sullivan and Justices Vertefeuille,
Katz, Palmer, and Zarella. Meanwhile, the United States
Supreme Court has heard and decided a state case on its dock-
et, Georgia v. Randolph,7 which raised the federal constitu-
tional issue reached by only one of the five justices who decid-
ed Brunetti the first time around. The court held that one co-
tenant's consent to search a home does not trump the refusal by
a second present co-tenant who refuses consent.8 The United
States Supreme Court was also split, with a five justice major-
ity opinion and three dissenting opinions.9
While the Connecticut Supreme Court reconsiders its
Brunetti decision en banc and in light of Georgia v. Randolph,
its original decision remains important and interesting on a
number of grounds. The three justices voting to reverse
Brunetti's conviction were split in their reasoning. Justice
Vertefeuille wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
5 (cont.) the West Haven police department when the father signed a consent to
search form and the mother refused to do so. The son was in the interrogation room
at the police department, though not formally under arrest at the time that his father
gave consent. On the authority of the father's consents, the police searched the
Brunetti home and found in the laundry area recently washed items of clothing,
including a towel and sweat pants with "'bleach-like stains"' and two tank tops, one
with "reddish brown blood-like stains." The police then informed the suspect that
they had discovered and seized the items, at which point the suspect requested a
Bible, was given Miranda warnings, and made statements inculpating himself in the
murder. Thereafter, he was formally arrested. Id. at 43-45.
6 Id. at 41-65 (Vertefeuille, J., plurality opinion); 66-86 (Katz, J., concurring);
86-143 (Palmer, J., dissenting, joined by Zarella, J.).
7 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed.2d 208 (March 26, 2006).
8 The majority wrote: "Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present
and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer
no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the
absence of any consent at all." 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
9 Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justices Stevens and Breyer also filed concurring
opinions. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote dis-
senting opinions. Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.
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Sullivan joined, finding the search of the defendant's home
unconstitutional based on a new state constitutional rule that
would require the consent of both co-occupants, if both are
present, before the police may conduct search their home.
Concurring, Justice Katz recognized the same rule but on fed-
eral, not state, constitutional grounds. Applying the Golding
test10 for reviewing unpreserved claims of constitutional error,
the Court found the record sufficient to support review of the
defendant's appellate claim and reversal of his conviction even
though the defendant had not made the same claim in the trial
court. 1 Passionate in dissent, Justice Palmer, joined by Justice
Zarella, castigated the plurality for finding the record adequate
to support Golding review and called the reversal "a result that
is both wholly unwarranted and grossly unfair to the state." 12
Justice Vertefeuille's plurality opinion held that Article I,
Section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution "favor[s] the rule
requiring the consent of both co-occupants when both are pres-
ent to consent to a search." 13  It is notable that the plurality
opinion did not engage in federal constitutional analysis at all. 14
The plurality applied the "framework" for state constitutional
10 State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239 (1989).
11 Id. at 47-53. The plurality accorded review of the defendant's constitutional
challenge to the search of his home under the Golding doctrine which permits
review of unpreserved claims of error in criminal cases where the record is adequate
for review and the record shows a clear violation of a fundamental constitutional
right. Justice Katz agreed with the plurality but noted "that the adequacy of the
record to review the claim in this case warrants further explanation." Id. at 69.
Reviewing the record to determine whether it supported the factual finding that the
defendant's mother had actually refused to consent, Justice Katz concluded: "I dis-
agree with the state's contention that the record merely reflects that the defendant's
mother refused to sign the consent form and that such failure to sign is not tanta-
mount to a refusal to consent." Id. at 72.
12 Id. at 86. Justice Palmer noted that his "comments" were applicable both to
the plurality and the concurring opinions. Id. at 86 n.2.
13 Id. at 65.
14 The plurality gave two reasons for giving primacy to the state constitution and
eschewing any federal constitutional analysis: (I) that the defendant had briefed his
claim "primarily and substantially under the state constitution" and (2) that "fourth
amendment jurisprudence is not instructive with regard to the defendant's claim in
the present case." Id. at 51 n.7. The plurality added: "The issue of whether the con-
sent of both present joint occupants is required when authorities seek consent to
search the occupants' jointly controlled property has not been addressed directly by
the United States Supreme Court. Id.
15 Id. at 51-52 (citing State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 (1992)). It is notable that
the same appellate attorney represented Brunetti and Geisler.
(Vol. 80
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analysis established in State v. Geisler.15 The plurality found a
textual, historical, and precedential basis under Connecticut law
for the "fundamental significance of the constitutional right to
privacy in the home"16 and for according a preference for war-
rants such that "a warrantless search is per se unreasonable,jus-
tified only by limited exceptions ...." 17  The plurality distin-
guished a number of state and federal cases that held that one
co-occupant's consent sufficed to authorize a police search, as
many cases involve exigent circumstances, including the spec-
tre of one co-occupant victimizing the other.18 After taking
account of the case law that does require both occupants' con-
sents 19 and of Professor LaFave's treatise on search and
seizure,20 the plurality found dispositive "the sixth Geisler fac-
tor, the public policy implications of adopting the defendant's
position."21 The plurality declared:
We conclude that the rule requiring the consent of both pres-
ent joint occupants strikes the appropriate balance between
individual liberties and police expediency. Specifically,
requiring the consent of both present joint occupants for a
valid consent search is consistent with our manifest prefer-
ence for warrants and our well established regard for the
sanctity of the home. We agree that, under [United States v.]
Matlock,22 an absent joint occupant assumes the risk that a
present joint occupant may permit access to shared space for
a search. To extend this assumption of risk analysis to the
present circumstances, however, would relegate the objecting
joint occupant's constitutional rights to inferior status. Our
long-standing public policy of protecting the sanctity of the
home and favoring searches conducted pursuant to a warrant
weighs heavily against such a result.23
Justice Katz wrote a concurring opinion in which she
agreed with the plurality's result but disputed its analytic pref-
erence for the state constitution over the federal constitu-
16 Id. at 55.
17 Id. at 56.
18 Id. at 57-60.
19 Id. at 62-63.
20 Id. at 62 (quoting W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (4th Ed. 2004) §8.3(d),
p.159)).
21 Id. at 63.
22 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed.2d 242 (1974).
23 Id.
24 Justice Katz acknowledged that the defendant on appeal had done "an exten-
sive analysis of the Geisler factors in briefing his state constitutional claim" Id. at
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tion.24 Addressing the defendant's claim under the fourth
amendment, Justice Katz acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had not "spoken directly on this issue" and
that lower federal and state courts were "split on whether,
under the federal constitution, a person present and refusing
consent has a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest
when another similarly situated person consents to the
search." 25 Justice Katz ultimately reached "the issue left open
in [United States v.] Matlock26 and conclude[d] that, under the
federal constitution, a consent to search given by one co-occu-
pant is invalid as against the other when both are on the scene
and one has refused to consent."27 Justice Katz's federal con-
stitutional conclusion prefigured the recent Supreme Court
decision in Georgia v. Randolph.28
In State v. Edman, the Appellate Court drew a nice consti-
tutional distinction, not often illuminated in the case law,
between a valid warrant issued upon a finding of probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate and an invalid war-
rant supported by a finding of probable cause but issued by a
magistrate who is not "neutral and detached." 29 The Edman
24 (cont.) 67 n.4. But Justice Katz pointed out that the defendant had not con-
ceded "that he could not prevail under the federal constitution" and that "[gleneral-
ly, when we rely solely on the state constitution, we do so when the federal consti-
tution clearly does not afford the relief requested; ... or we conduct an analysis under
the state and federal constitutions together, treating the rights as coextensive." Id.
(internal citations omitted). Justice Katz concluded, "I fail to see a persuasive jus-
tification for deviating from our normal course and deciding the issue under the state
constitution alone." Id.
25 Id. at 75-76. Justice Katz noted that the majority view was "that consent of a
co-occupant should prevail, despite the objection of a co-occupant who is present." Id.
at 76. Justice Katz surmised that such courts may have been influenced by facts in
which one of the co-occupants had engaged in criminal conduct against the other. Id.
26 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed.2d 242 (1974).
27 Id. at 82-83.
28 The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph addressed "two loose ends" left
by prior Supreme Court decisions, including United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed.2d 242 (1974). Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527-28. First, the
court held that Matlock had left open the issue whether a co-tenant's consent was
sufficient to authorize a police entry and search in the face of a physically present
tenant who objects, as Matlock had held only that a co-tenant's consent was "good
against 'the absent, nonconsenting' resident". Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (quot-
ing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170). Second, the court held that the police need not seek
out a second tenant for permission to search if that person is not present and "there
is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the
entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection...." Id. at 1527.
29 90 Conn. App. 820, 826 (2005).
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court ruled that the trial court should have granted the defen-
dant's motion to suppress narcotics seized from his home
under authority of a warrant that was issued by a judge whose
past friendliness with the defendant disqualified the judge
from fulfilling the fourth amendment role of magistrates in the
warrant issuance process. The defendant, a former marshal in
the court, presented an affidavit in the trial court describing his
relationship with the judge who had issued the warrant. The
two had assisted one another personally and vocationally and
developed a friendship. The police executing the warrant told
the defendant that the friendly judge "had signed the warrant
and had been 'sick to his stomach' for having had to do so."30
Reviewing the seminal United States Supreme Court cases 31
involving the fourth amendment role of neutral and detached
magistrates, the Appellate Court wrote: "we glean that a mag-
istrate's neutrality and detachment may be compromised in
one of two ways - either (1) by his or her conduct or (2) by
indicia of partiality." 32 The court quoted the state's argument
that, if anything, based on the friendship, the judge "'would
have had more of a stake in assuring either that the search war-
rant not issue or that it was valid and supported by ample prob-
able cause."' 33 Re-casting the state's argument as a conces-
sion, the court explained that the state had "acknowledged that
an inherent temptation existed for [the judge] to treat the case
differently from any other case." 34 The court concluded: "hav-
ing what the state described as a 'stake' in the matter cuts
against the very grain of the fourth amendment notion of neu-
trality and detachment." 35 Rejecting the state's request for a
full evidentiary hearing on the judge's neutrality and detach-
ment, the court declared that the state's opportunity to dispute
the defendant's affidavit had been when the issue was present-
ed in the trial court. The Edman court reversed based on the
lack of a neutral and detached magistrate, not because the
30 Id. at 824.
31 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2002, 29 L. Ed.2d 564
(1971); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed.2d 444 (1977);
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,99 S. Ct. 2319,60 L. Ed.2d 920 (1979).
32 90 Conn. App. at 828.




magistrate had erred in determining that the warrant was sup-
ported by probable cause. The court remanded with an order
that the defendant's motion to suppress be granted.
While other search and seizure cases did not require re-
examination of cardinal principles as in Brunetti and Edman,
they presented interesting applications of established princi-
ples. In State v. Pink,36 the Supreme Court made short work
of the defendant's claim that the Department of Correction
had violated his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches when a correctional officer strip-searched him as he
was about to be taken to court for an appearance in his mur-
der case. Previously the DOC had intercepted a phone con-
versation between the defendant and his sister and learned
that he was going to bring a note to hand his sister in the
courtroom. The officer who searched the defendant found a
note in his pocket which set forth his plan to hire a terminal-
ly ill person to take the blame for the murder with which the
defendant was charged. The court found that the fruits of the
search did not require suppression of the note at trial because
the DOC search did not violate an expectation of privacy of
the defendant that society would recognize as reasonable in
the prison setting: "[t]he department has an important securi-
ty interest in searching prisoners before transporting them to
and from court appearances and the defendant was or rea-
sonably should have been aware of that practice." 37
In State v. Vazquez,38 the Appellate Court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that the police were not justified in relying on his
girlfriend's consent for them to enter and search his apartment
for a firearm connecting the defendant to an armed robbery.
The girlfriend told the police that she resided in the apartment
with her children and that the defendant was not home. She
signed a written consent form for the search. Soon after begin-
ning the search, the police found the defendant under a bed and
took from his grasp folded bills as evidence of the robbery. The
girlfriend then withdrew her consent to search, stating that she
was not the renter and did not reside in the apartment. The
36 274 Conn. 241, 256-61 (2005).
37 Id. at 260.
38 87 Conn. App. 792 (2005)
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police ceased their search for a firearm but the money was used
as evidence at the robbery trial. 39 The court found that it was
reasonable for the police to have depended on the girlfriend's
apparent authority to consent to the search. 40
II. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD AND
IN THE COURTROOM.
In State v. Ledbetter,4 t the Supreme Court rejected feder-
al and state constitutional challenges to the admissibility of an
identification of the defendant by the victim of a street rob-
bery.4 2 The defendant and multiple amici curiae4 3 presented
the court with "research on the perils of eyewitness identifi-
cation" that were not sufficient to persuade the court that the
police had violated the constitutional standard4 4 that governs
motions to suppress identifications that are produced by
police identification procedures. 4 5 Further the court rejected
the argument that the state constitution places a greater
restriction than does the federal constitution on eyewitness
identification procedures conducted by the police.4 6
Notwithstanding its rejection of the defendant's constitutional
claims and over the state's objection that an appellate court
39 Id. at 800-01.
40 Id. at 802-03.
41 275 Conn. 534 (2005), cert. denied, Ledbetter v. Connecticut, 2006 U.S.
LEXIS 3103 (U.S., Apr. 17, 2006).
42 The victim had been attacked on the street by two persons who had fled in a
black sedan containing three other black males. Id. at 538-39 The police soon
apprehended five suspects in such a car and, upon hearing a dispatcher's report of
the apprehension, the witness asked to be taken to where the vehicle had been
stopped in order to attempt an identification. Id. at 539-40. The witness identified
the defendant and a second suspect, but, as to a third suspect, "could not be '100 per-
cent positive . I..." d. at 540.
43 Id. at 546 n.10 (lists amici curiae).
44 The established due process standard requires that a defendant making a motion
to suppress an identification prove both that a police identification procedure is "unnec-
essarily suggestive" and that it resulted in an "unreliable" identification. Id. at 546-48.
45 The court noted that it lacks the authority to find that the federal constitution
places greater restrictions upon police activity than the restrictions recognized by the
United States Supreme court. Id. at 559. But the court recognized the theoretical
possibility that the Connecticut Constitution could impose greater restrictions on
police activity. Id. at 560.
46 Applying the six factor "'analytical framework"' for reviewing state consti-
tutional claims from State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672,684-86 (1992), the court found
that three Geisler factors (federal precedent, textual approach, holdings and dicta of
Connecticut appellate courts) were in the state's favor, two factors (historical, sib-
ling state approach) were "neutral," and "[tihe sixth factor, economic and sociolog-
ical considerations, favors the defendant." Ledbettei, 275 Conn. at 561-63, 566.
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should not consider economic, scientific and social research
not presented in the trial court,4 7 the Ledbetter court demon-
strated receptivity to the research on "the potential dangers of
eyewitness identification" presented by the defendant and the
amici curiae in their briefs.48
The defendant and amici curiae argued that research shows
that an eyewitness's certainty is not a reliable indicator of the
witness's accuracy in making an identification, that level of
certainty is given too much stock by judges ruling on admissi-
bility and jurors hearing eyewitness testimony, and that an eye-
witness's certainty is "'malleable' or susceptible to cues from
the administrator of the identification procedure." 49  The
court, however, pointed out that studies varied in their results
on the correlation, whether negative, positive or nonexistent,
"between witness confidence and the accuracy of the identifi-
cation." 50 The court declined to adopt a rule that an identifi-
cation procedure is per se suggestive if the police fail to indi-
cate to the witness that the police may not have included the
perpetrator in the procedure.51 Nonetheless, the court was
impressed with scientific research supporting the contention of
the amici curiae that "[w]ithout such a warning, ... the witness
feels obligated to select one of the photographs or participants
in the procedure, which may result in the witness choosing the
individual who is the most similar to or least dissimilar from
the actual perpetrator, regardless of whether the perpetrator is
one of the choices in the identification procedure." 52
Based on its nuanced consideration of the research pre-
sented on appeal, the court broke new ground in the law in
two very significant ways. First, in a signal to criminal prac-
titioners and trial judges, the court declared that trial courts
should take account of the research on eyewitness identifica-
tion in employing the established due process test for deter-
47 Id. at 567.
48 Id. at 566-69.
49 Id. at 566-67.
50 Id. at 568-69.
51 Id. at 569-70.
52 Id. at 571. The court sets forth in some detail the research that calls into ques-
tion the "'relative judgment process' that eyewitnesses may employ when police
do not give them the understanding that the culprit being sought may in fact not be
included in the police identification procedure. Id. at 572.
[Vol. 80
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mining whether an identification is admissible or not.53
Second, signaling that the defendant and amici curiae had
struck a deep chord with their presentation on the usefulness
of science in improving the reliability of criminal judgments,
the court declared:
Because of the importance of eyewitness identifications in
the criminal justice system and the risks of failing to warn the
witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the
identification procedure, we deem it appropriate to exercise
our supervisory authority to require an instruction to the jury
in those cases where the identification procedure administra-
tor fails to provide such a warning, unless no significant risk
of misidentification exists.
The Ledbetter decision is likely to have a lasting value in
Connecticut law. The court balanced the valid and sometimes
competing interests of law enforcement with a concern that
the law should not remain static where there is new research
whose recognition may lead to more reliable criminal trial
verdicts. The court noted that "case studies consistently iden-
tify mistaken identifications as a significant source of wrong-
ful convictions of innocent people." 54 Balanced against the
spectre of wrongful convictions, the court declared:
"Nevertheless, we must recognize that eyewitness identifica-
tion remains a vital element in the investigation and adjudica-
tion of criminal acts." 55 Concluding, the court wrote:
Although neither the federal nor the state constitution
requires additional protections beyond the Manson standard;
... we retain an interest in mitigating the risks of misidenti-
53 "We reiterate, however, that an indication by the identification procedure
administrator that a suspect is present in the procedure is an unnecessarily sugges-
tive element of the process that should be considered by the trial court in its analy-
sis. See State v. Austin, 195 Conn. 496, 500 (1985). We also agree that the trial
court, as part of its analysis, should consider whether the identification procedure
administrator instructed the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present
in the procedure and should take into account the results of the research studies con-
cerning that instruction." Id. at 574-75.
54 ld. at 576. The court noted that a study commissioned by the National
Institute of Justice that reviewed twenty-eight cases in which DNA was used to
exonerate defendants had "concluded that '[i]n the majority of the cases, given the
absence of DNA evidence at the trial, eyewitness testimony was the most com-
pelling evidence."' Id. (quoting E. CONNORS, T. LUNDREGAN & N. MILLER ET A L,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, National Institute of Justice, Dept.
Of Justice Pub. No. NCJ 161258 (1996), p. 24.
55 275 Conn. at 577.
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fication in the courts of this state. Therefore, we invoke our
supervisory authority to do so.56
The court took the extraordinary step of providing a
model instruction that it directed trial courts to employ.57
III. TRIAL PROCEDURE: COUNSEL CASES.
Both the Supreme and Appellate courts reversed criminal
convictions involving pro se defendants who had not been
adequately canvassed to ensure that they were waiving the
right to counsel and choosing self-representation with their
eyes open to the risks that the choice carries.
In State v. Diaz58 the defendant was convicted of narcotics
and firearm charges and sentenced to serve forty-three years.
The record showed that the trial court did not inform the
defendant that his criminal exposure in the case was "a peri-
od of nearly fifty years." 59 The Supreme Court agreed with
the defendant's claim that "his waiver of counsel was not
knowing, intelligent and voluntary by virtue of the trial
court's failure to inform him of the range of possible penal-
ties that he would face upon conviction." 60
In State v. Ming Zhi Li,6 1 the defendant was convicted in
a bench trial of criminal trespass in the first degree and sen-
56 Id.
57 The instruction is as follows:
In this case, the state has presented evidence that an eyewitness identified
the defendant in connection with the crime charged. That identification was
the result of an identification procedure in which the individual conducting the
procedure either indicated to the witness that a suspect was present in
the procedure or failed to warn the witness that the perpetrator may or may
not be in the procedure. Indicating to a witness that a suspect is present in
an identification procedure or failing to warn the witness that the perpetrat-
or may or may not be in the procedure may increase the likelihood that the
witness will select one of the individuals in the procedure even when the per-
petrator is not present. Thus, such action on the part of the procedure
administrator may increase the probability of a misidentification.
This information is not intended to direct you to give more or less weight to
the eyewitness identification evidence offered by the state. It is your duty to
determine what weight to give to that evidence. You may, however; take into
account this information, as just explained to you, in making that determi-
nation.
Id. at 579-80 (Emphasis in original).
58 274 Conn. 818 (2005).
59 Id. at 831.
60 Id. at 828.
61 90 Conn. App. 52 (2005).
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tenced to one year of incarceration, execution suspended
after thirty days, with two years conditional discharge. The
defendant twice applied for a public defender, but was denied
with the court declaring: "'there is no chance that you could
go to jail if convicted. And we don't allow public defenders
for nonjailable offenses."' 62 The case was transferred to the
infractions docket, but it was placed back on the criminal
docket and the criminal trespass charge was reinstated. The
court informed the defendant that he faced incarceration for
a year, but not that he was entitled to counsel. On appeal the
Appellate Court found that the defendant's constitutional
right to counsel had been violated and the state conceded that
the violation "was harmful to the defendant." Noting that
the defendant had already served his prison sentence, the
court stated: "Regrettably, . . . the only relief that this court
can provide to him is a reversal of his wrongful conviction."
Additionally, the court took the "unusual action of dismissing
the information in this instance because the defendant has
already served his sentence." 63
Commonly, trial courts appoint standby counsel for crimi-
nal defendants who choose to exercise their constitutional right
to self-representation. In State v. Beaulieu,64 reversed in part
on other grounds, the Supreme Court learned at oral argument
that a pro se defendant had been appointed a different standby
counsel for each day of his three day trial. Though not claimed
as error on appeal, the Beaulieu court took the opportunity to
express its "concern over the trial court's decision to allow this
practice."65 The court noted that Practice Book Section 44-5
requires standby counsel upon the defendant's request "to
advise the defendant as to legal and procedural matters" and
further provides "[i]f there is no objection by the defendant,
such counsel may also call the judicial authority's attention to
matters favorable to the defendant." The Supreme Court
described the purpose behind the appointment of standby
counsel is "to ensure a defendant meaningful access to the
courts." 66 That purpose is undercut where different counsel
62 Id. at 56.
63 Id. at 58.
64 274 Conn. 471 (2005).
65 Id. at 478 n.3.
66 Id.
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each day acts as standby, each counsel thereby lacking a first-
hand understanding of the "legal issues and strategies [that]
become evident only in the course of the unfolding of a
trial." 67 The court issued an order that should become the
norm in Connecticut practice hereafter: a single standby coun-
sel should be appointed for the duration of trial. 68
In Higgins v. Liston,69 the Appellate Court reviewed a writ
of error brought on behalf of the petitioner in error who
claimed that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he
was convicted of summary criminal contempt and given six
extra months in jail for his obnoxious behavior in response to
being sentenced in his criminal case. The Higgins court
reviewed binding Supreme Court precedent holding that
summary criminal contempt proceedings are not criminal
prosecutions. 70 Therefore, neither the Sixth amendment or
state constitutional right to counsel in "all criminal prosecu-
tions" nor due process of law required that Higgins be
accorded counsel when he was summarily held in contempt
and sentenced for it.71
Both the sovereign and the defendant rely on professional
counsel in our system of criminal justice to make sure that
criminal trials are fairly and sufficiently contested. When
either government counsel or defense counsels fail function-
ally, the adversarial process breaks down and trial results are
less dependable. In 2005, many cases raised issues relating
to the performance of counsel for the state, as well as of
counsel for the defense. A short and selective review of
counsel cases involving prosecutorial misconduct and inef-
fective assistance of defense counsel follows.
Christopher Champagne recently published in this journal
a thorough review of the history of prosecutorial misconduct
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 88 Conn. App. 599 (2005).
70 The Higgins court noted that the paperwork for the writ of error had mistak-
enly cited CONN. GEN. STAT. Section 51-33a instead of Section 51-33. The former
statute applies to prosecutions for criminal contempt by way of information and the
latter statute applies to summary criminal contempt, which "allows the court, as it
did in this case, to proceed to resolve such matters summarily at the tie of the con-
tumacious conduct ..... Id. at 609 n.6. The distinction between the two modes of
criminal contempt was pivotal in the Higgins decision.
71 Id. at 610-13.
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claims in Connecticut from 1902 to 2005.72 It is not neces-
sary to cover the same territory in this article. However, a
few cases decided in 2005 bear special mention. Of the many
cases reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct during
trial and at final argument, two stand out which raise the
question whether and when prosecutorial misconduct may
deprive a defendant of a fair trial on only some, not all, of the
charges in the case. In State v. Beaulieu,73 the defendant was
convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping
in the first degree. On appeal the Appellate Court found that
the trial prosecutor had committed misconduct in examining
a witness and at final argument, but found that it had an
impact on the fairness of the trial as to the sexual assault
charge and not the kidnapping charge.
The Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
certification for review of the kidnapping affirmance. The
state did not seek certification to challenge the reversal of the
sexual assault conviction. In hearing the defendant's appeal,
the Supreme Court declared: "We therefore take it as a given
that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct that
deprived the defendant of a fair trial on that conviction." 74
The Supreme Court posited that the issue was "whether there
was a significant difference in the facts and circumstances of
the kidnapping conviction to warrant a different result." The
Supreme Court faulted the Appellate Court's differentiation
between the misconduct's impact on the two verdicts, noting
that the prosecutor's jury summation had not made such a
differentiation regarding the state's proof of the two charges.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that misconduct had vio-
lated the defendant's right to a fair trial on the kidnapping
count just as it had on the sexual assault count.75
It would be a misconstruction to read Beaulieu to mean
that prosecutorial misconduct that deprives a defendant of a
fair trial on one count deprives him on all counts. Later in the
72 Christopher M. Champagne, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Connecticut: A
Review, 78 CONN. BAR. J. 196-230 (2004).
73 274 Conn. 471 (2005).
74 Id. at 476-77.
75 Id. at 480-83.
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year the Supreme Court reviewed another case in which pros-
ecutorial misconduct was found by the Appellate Court, only
this time it was the state that sought obtained certification to
appeal. In State v. Spencer,76 the state argued that prosecu-
torial misconduct had occurred but that it required reversal of
only two of the defendant's convictions, not all four convic-
tions. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that reversal was
not required for the defendant's risk of injury to a child and
sexual assault in the second degree convictions: "there is no
reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict on these charges
would have been different absent the misconduct." 77
In State v. Michael J.,78 the Supreme Court issued a split
decision on whether the trial court abused its discretion in rul-
ing on the defendant's motion to dismiss without first holding
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the trial prosecutor
had deliberately provoked the defendant's motion for a mistri-
al. Justice Zarella, joined by Justices Norcott and Vertefeuille,
held that the trial court had properly denied the motion to dis-
miss without holding a hearing. Justice Katz, joined by Justice
Borden, dissented. The state had charged the defendant with
two counts of risk of injury to a child, one count of sexual
assault in the first degree, and one count of sexual assault in the
second degree, based on his alleged sexual abuse of his eleven
year old daughter in November and December of 1998.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine so
that the state was limited to offering evidence relating to the
charges brought and not evidence of other acts of miscon-
duct. When the child complainant testified, she related
events that exceeded the scope of the in limine ruling. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial but
later denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the
double jeopardy principle that the sovereign may not inten-
tionally provoke a mistrial and then retry the defendant. 79
76 275 Conn. 171 (2005).
77 Id. at 183. The court explained that in Beaulieu "we concluded that there was
an insufficient disparity in the strength of the state's evidence, absent the tainted tes-
timony, on each conviction to justify the different outcomes." Spencer, 275 Conn. at
181 (citing State v. Beaulieu, 274 Conn. at 480).
78 274 Conn. 321 (2005).
79 Id. at 324-331. The seminal federal and state cases on that proposition are
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982), and
State v. Colten, 234 Conn. 683 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. C t. 972,
133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996).
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The majority in Michael J. held that the trial court had been
within its discretion in finding that the trial prosecutor's con-
duct was not intended to provoke a mistrial, in part because
the trial court had observed the events and was entitled to
credit the trial prosecutor's representation that the witness's
testimony was unexpected. 80
In addition to his federal double jeopardy claim, the
defendant in Michael J. raised an independent claim under
the state constitution. Section III of Justice Zarella's major-
ity opinion, with which the dissenters concurred, rejected the
defendant's claim that the state constitution supports a broad-
er double jeopardy protection than the double jeopardy
clause in the Fifth Amendment. 8 1 The Connecticut constitu-
tion does not contain a double jeopardy clause, but
Connecticut courts have consistently recognized that protec-
tion against double jeopardy "is implied in the due process
and personal liberty guarantees of article first, Sections 8 and
9, of the constitution of Connecticut." 82  But Connecticut
precedent has "historically accorded less protection against
double jeopardy than the federal constitution." 8 3
80 274 Conn. at 335. The majority relied upon the proposition that declarations
to the court by officers of the court, i.e., attorneys, "'are virtually made under
oath."' Id. (quoting State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 420 (1996). The same proposi-
tion has been applied to counsel's representations in reply to a court's inquiry into a
possible conflict of interest. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 87 Conn. App. 126, 133
(2005) ("the court may rely on the solemn representation of a fact made by habeas
counsel as an officer of the court. The course thereafter followed by the court in its
inquiry depends on the circumstances of the particular case."); State v. Drakeford,
261 Conn. 420,426-27 (2002).
81 274 Conn. at 349-61 (majority) & 361 n.1 (concurrence).
82 State v. Nixon, 92 Conn. App. 586, 589-90 n.4 (2005) (citing State v.
Kasprzyk, 255 Conn. 185, 192 (2001). In Nixon, the Appellate Court held that the
defendant's two convictions of assault in the second degree for stabbing a single vic-
tim twice in one altercation violated the double jeopardy clause bar on multiple
punishments for the same offense. Nixon, 92 Conn. App. at 589-97 ("To say, for
example, that our legislature intended that a defendant charged with simple assault,
where ten blows were thrown, could be tried and found not guilty at one trial relat-
ing only to the first punch thrown and then, following the state's argument, subse-
quently charged and brought to trial nine more times, all on the basis of one fight
with one victim in one place in one very short period of time, simply does not com-
port with our reading of the statute, nor does it comport with the history of the pros-
ecution of similar offenses in our case law." Id. at 594-95.).
83 Id. at 351. Justice Zarella traces Connecticut's long-standing minority view
of double jeopardy law to State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265 (1894). The Lee court's theo-
ry of continuing jeopardy "stood in direct contrast to federal constitutional jurispru-
dence as espoused by the United State Supreme Court in Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100, 129, 132-33, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904) (holding that double
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Interestingly, Justice Zarella's analysis focuses on the
Connecticut Constitution of 1965, not the original state con-
stitution of 1818, and notes that the delegates at the 1965
Connecticut Constitutional Convention considered and
rejected "an amendment that would have added a specific
double jeopardy clause to our constitution." 84
Just as prosecutorial misconduct claims require proof both
that misconduct occurred and that it had an impact on the
defendant's right to a fair trial, so must challenges to the con-
duct of defense counsel include proof both of deficient per-
formance and actual prejudice. However, because the right
to effective assistance of counsel is part of the right to coun-
sel guarantee specifically set forth in the sixth amendment,
the defendant need not prove that he was denied a fair trial by
due process standards as is the case for prosecutorial mis-
conduct claims. Rather a criminal client must prove that, but
for his lawyer's deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different. 85
83 (cont.) jeopardy clause of fifth amendment barred retrial of defendant after he
had been acquitted and noting that vase majority of states adhered to that rule)."
Michael J., 274 Conn. at 352. It is of consequence that Justice Holmes, dissenting
in Kepner, cited "the well-reasoned decision in State v. Lee, 65 Connecticut, 265."
Kepner, 195 U.S. at 135. Connecticut's commitment to the continuing jeopardy the-
ory was the basis of the state's successful appeal from the defendant's conviction of
murder in the second degree and its conviction of him at a second trial for the cap-
ital crime of murder in the first degree in the Palko case. See State v. Palko, 121
Conn. 669, 681 (1936) (state's successful appeal of errors at first trial); State v.
Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 538-42 (1937) (holding that the Lee principle of continuing
jeopardy is consistent with due process under the state and federal constitutions; not-
ing that Lee decision "has been referred to by a great jurist as a 'well-reasoned deci-
sion."' Id. at 539 (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. at 135)). Justice
Cardozo for the United States Supreme Court rejected Palko's claim that the pro-
tections of the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Deciding that the Kepner majority's model of
double jeopardy is not a right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Justice
Cardozo made use of the fact that "right-minded men" (e.g.., Justice Holmes) "could
reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe that a second trial was lawful in prosecu-
tions subject to the Fifth Amendment, if it was all in the same case." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-23, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
84 Michael J., 274 Conn. at 352-53. In a provocative footnote, the court writes:
"Indeed, our historical analysis leads us to question the fundamental premise of the
defendant's claim, namely, whether a guarantee against double jeopardy even exists
in the state constitution. In other words, if our constitutional forebears [in 1965]
rejected an express textual ban on double jeopardy in the revised constitution of
Connecticut, then how could they have intended that such a right be implied in the
due process clause?" Id. at 353-54 n.16 (Bracketed material added.).
85 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
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In Ledbetter v. Commissioner,86 the Supreme Court reject-
ed the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
when he tactically chose to concede voluntariness in chal-
lenging the admission of a confession on other grounds. The
petitioner claimed that trial counsel's concession was unrea-
sonable because it precluded petitioner from later raising a
"novel" state constitutional claim that voluntariness should be
judged differently for juveniles. 87 The Ledbetter court found
that counsel's performance was reasonable:
To conclude that counsel is obligated to recognize and to pre-
serve previously undecided constitutional claims, the viability
of which is purely speculative, would be to require criminal
defense lawyers to possess a measure of clairvoyance that the
sixth amendment surely does not demand. 88
In Dontigney v. Commissioner,89 the Appellate Court sus-
tained the dismissal of the petitioner's second habeas corpus
case and denial of certification to appeal on grounds of res
judicata. In his first habeas case the petitioner had claimed
that his trial counsel had prevented him from testifying at his
trial when petitioner arrived at court intoxicated. In his sec-
ond habeas case, he alleged that his lawyer "should have
requested a continuance to give the petitioner time to become
sober." 90 The Appellate Court noted that the first habeas peti-
tion had decided the prejudice prong of the Strickland test
against the petitioner: "'the habeas court made a factual
determination that his testimony lacked credibility and found
that his testimony at the criminal trial would not have caused
a different result."' 9 ' For that reason the Appellate Court
concluded that collateral estoppel barred the petitioner from
relitigating the issue of prejudice and that the habeas court
had correctly denied certification to appeal its dismissal of
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In Thompson v. Commissioner,92 the Appellate Court
86 275 Conn. 451 (2005).
87 Id. at 458-60.
88 Id. at 462.
89 87 Conn. App. 681 (2005).
90 Id. at 683.
91 Id. at 684-85 (quoting Dontigney v. Commissioner, 42 Conn. App. 304, 305-
06, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 918 (1996)).
92 91 Conn. App. 205, 207, 21-16 (2005).
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found ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel did not
make a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds,
given that the defendant was not arrested until 1998 on a fail-
ure to appear warrant that issued in 1989. In Brown v.
Commissioner,93 the Appellate Court considered and reject-
ed an unorthodox claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on two public defenders' alleged failure to provide the
petitioner with a copy of the client's file in a timely manner
after the public defenders withdrew from representation two
years into the case because the client was not then eligible for
assistance. 94 The Brown court found "it troubling that the
petitioner did not have possession of his file prior to the com-
mencement of trial" but concluded that the public defenders
had not performed deficiently and that they "acted in accor-
dance with statutory law when they withdrew their represen-
tation." 95  The court added that the "petitioner must bear
some of the responsibility for his own inaction in not request-
ing his file even once following his counsel's withdrawal." 96
IV. TRIAL PROCEDURE: JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Several cases on the adequacy and propriety of jury charges
announced new rules. In State v. Patterson,97 the Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to
commit murder because the trial court did not comply with the
defendant's request to charge the jury that a jailhouse infor-
mant's testimony should "be reviewed with particular scrutiny
and weighed . ..with greater care than the testimony of an
ordinary witness." 98 The chief state's witness was an inform-
ant who testified that the defendant made various admissions
to him during the seven months that he and the defendant were
cellmates after the defendant's arrest. The informant agreed to
assist police in exchange for various benefits including a
reduction in his current sentence, favorable sentencing recom-
mendations for as yet unresolved charges, a jail transfer, and
93 92 Conn. App. 382 (2005).
94 Id. at 386.
95 Id. at 388-89.
96 Id. at 389.
97 276 Conn. 452 (2005).
98 Id. at 465.
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restoration of visitation privileges. 99 The Supreme Court
noted that special instructions for particular witnesses are not
generally required in the law but that there are two exceptions
to the rule, "the complaining witness exception and the accom-
plice exception."100 The court agreed with the defendant that
"an informant who has been promised a benefit by the state in
return for his or her testimony has a powerful incentive, fueled
by self-interest, to implicate falsely the accused." 10 1 Because
such informant testimony is "inevitably suspect," the court
announced a third exception for informants: "Because the tes-
timony of an informant who expects to receive a benefit from
the state in exchange for his or her cooperation is no less sus-
pect than the testimony of an accomplice who expects lenien-
cy from the state, we conclude that the defendant was entitled
to an instruction substantially in accord with the one that he
had sought."']0 2
In State v. Cortes,l0 3 the Supreme Court granted the state's
petition for certification to appeal two issues, one of which
was "'Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
trial court's instructional references to the complainant as the
"the victim" deprived the defendant of his right to a fair
trial?" ' 104 The Supreme Court did not decide that certified
issue because the other issue mandated a new trial.
Nonetheless, in an important footnote, the court related that
the trial court's jury charge referred to the complainant as the
"victim" seventy-six times. 10 5 The state conceded that the
references were improper but made the argument that the ref-
erences in context meant only that the complainant was the
alleged victim. The Supreme Court remarked, "[t]he state's
contention is, at best, dubious."10 6 The court pointed out that
99 Id. at 459-60, 465.
100 Id. at 467.
101 Id. at 469.
102 Id. at 470. The Patterson court overruled State v. Santiago, 48 Conn. App.
19, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 901 (1998), a decision relied upon by the state for the
proposition that a special credibility instruction is only required for a complaining
witness or an accomplice. Patterson, 276 Conn. at 470-71.
103 276 Conn. 241 (2005).
104 Id. at 242 n.1 (quoting State v. Cortes, 271 Conn. 917 (2004).
105 Id. at 249 n.4.
106 Id.
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the commonly understood meaning of "victim" is "the person
harmed by a crime or other injurious event." 107 The court
concluded:
In the context of the present case, the jury could have drawn
only one inference from its repeated use, namely, that the
defendant had committed a crime against the complainant.
For this reason, we agree with those courts that have deemed
references to the complainant as the "victim" inappropriate
where the very commission of a crime is at issue. 108
In State v. DeJesus,109 the Appellate Court found error in
a jury instruction on a charge of conspiracy to commit mur-
der where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the
conspiracy count related to the same victim named in the
murder count of the same information but not to a second
person alleged as the victim in a third count charging
attempted murder. I 0
The Pinkerton' doctrine of vicarious liability was the sub-
ject of claims of error in conspiracy cases. In State v.
Santiago,1' 2 the Supreme Court held that the state was not col-
laterally estopped from prosecuting the defendant for burglary
in the first degree where his separately tried co-conspirator had
been acquitted of burglary in the first degree and where the
sole theory of liability for the defendant was vicarious liabili-
ty under Pinkerton for the conduct of the other conspirator.' 13
In State v. McFarlane,1 14 the Appellate Court upheld the defen-
dant's convictions of burglary in the third degree and larceny
in the first degree under Pinkerton because the defendant's par-
ticipation in planning the crimes and as a lookout "was not so
attenuated or remote that it was unjust to hold him responsible
for his coconspirators' criminal conduct.""15
107 Id.
108 Id. (authorities cited here omitted).
109 92 Conn. App. 92 (2005).
110 Id. at 102-04, 108-09. Two companion cases were tried and heard on appeal
with DeJesus were also reversed on the same basis, i.e., that there was a reasonable pos-
sibility that the jury convicted of conspiracy with reference to the wrong victim. State
v. Rivera, 92 Conn. App. 110 (2005); State v. Sanchez, 92 Conn. App. 112 (2005).
111 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946).
112 275 Conn. 192 (2005).
113 Id. at 197-99, 203-04.
114 88 Conn. App. 161 (2005).
"15 Id. at 168.
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The nature of conspiracy liability itself was the source of
error in State v. Coltherst 1 6 where the defendant was con-
victed and sentenced on counts of conspiracy, all arising out
of a single plan. On appeal the defendant, prosecution and
Appellate Court agreed that the six counts were the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes; accordingly, so the
court remanded for vacating of five of the six sentences. 117
In another case, the Supreme Court vacated a conviction of
conspiracy to commit manslaughter in the first degree with a
firearm, explaining that it "is not a cognizable crime because
it 'requires a logical impossibility, namely, that the actor...
[agree and] intend that an unintended death result.""' 18
Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm carries a
forty year maximum sentence, while manslaughter in the first
degree carries a twenty year maximum.1 19 Thus, in a series of
cases defendants tried for murder but convicted of manslaugh-
ter in the first degree with a firearm have disputed whether it
is a proper lesser included offense of murder. In State v.
Greene,120 the Supreme Court explained that Connecticut less-
er included offense law uses a "cognate pleadings" test1 21
under which manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is
sometimes a lesser included offense of murder and sometimes
not - depending on whether the information charging murder
alleged that the killing was committed with a firearm. Under
prong two of Connecticut's test for lesser included offenses,
the "relevant inquiry ... is whether it is possible to commit the
greater offense of murder, as described in the information,
116 87 Conn. App. 93 (2005).
117 Id. at 112-13. The seminal case on conspiracy as a single offense, whether
its object is one or many crimes, is Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63
S. Ct. 99, 87 L. Ed. 23 (1942). See also State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543,588 (1941);
State v. Kitt, 8 Conn. App. 478, 489, cert. denied, 202 Conn. 801 (1986); State v.
Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 173 (2005).
118 State v. Greene, 274 Conn 134, 164 (2005) (quoting State v. Almeda, 189
Conn. 303, 309 (1983)).
119 Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is set forth in CONN. GEN. STAT.
Section 53a-55a and manslaughter in the first degree is set forth in Section 53a-55.
120 274 Conn. 134 (2005).
121 Id. at 156. The "cognate-pleadings approach" is reflected in the second
prong of the four prong Whistnant test used in Connecticut in preference to ele-
ments-centered and evidence-centered tests used in some other jurisdictions. Id. at
156. (discussing State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 (1980) and its precursor
State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52 (1972)).
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without first having committed the lesser offense of
manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm." 12 2 In Greene
the information charging murder alleged "that the defendant
had the 'intent to cause the death of another person by means
of a firearm' and that he 'aided another in causing the death of
another,"' but the information did "not allege that either he or
the principal used, were armed with, threatened the use of, dis-
played or represented by their words or conduct that they pos-
sessed a firearm during the commission of the crime." 12 3 The
Greene court interpreted the state's charge to permit proof that
did not have to include shooting the victim with a firearm: "In
other words, the defendant and the principal could have carried
out the crime without a firearm and, thus, in a manner differ-
ent from that intended by the defendant." 124 Therefore, the
court found that the trial court's instruction on manslaughter in
the first degree with a firearm and the defendant's conviction
of it violated the constitution. 125 The court agreed, however,
with the state's argument that the appropriate remedy was to
vacate the judgment of conviction for manslaughter in the first
degree with a firearm and to remand with direction that the
judgment be modified to reflect a conviction of manslaughter
in the first degree and for resentencing.126
E. TRIAL PROOF: ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
A spate of cases decided in 2005 dealt with the elements of
proof for the different modes of liability set forth in the statute
defining risk of injury to a child, CONN. GEN. STAT. Section 53-
21. In State v. Robert H. 127 the Supreme Court affirmed the
Appellate Court's finding that the evidence was insufficient to
122 Id. at 158 (emphasis in original).
123 Id. at 158-59.
124 Id. at 159.
125 Id. at 160. The Greene court cited the sixth amendment right "to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation" but also noted that it would only "'assume
without deciding"' that right is applicable to the states. Id. at 153 n.15.
Alternatively, the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires specific notice
of criminal charges. Id. (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201,68 S. Ct. 514,
92 L. Ed. 644 (1948). See also State v. Aldridge, 87 Conn. App. 750, 753 (2005)
(claim that instruction and conviction of offense that is not lesser included offense
is reviewable claim of "constitutional dimension").
126 Id. at 160, 162.
127 273 Conn 56 (2005)
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sustain three of the defendant's four convictions of risk of
injury. The state's information for those counts charged that
the defendant "did an act likely to impair the health or morals
of a child under the age of sixteen years in violation of
[Section] 53-21(1) .... *"128 The Appellate Court had "deter-
mined that the defendant's act of asking F to place a syringe on
his penis and his act of exposing himself to F and B after exit-
ing the shower were not 'acts directly perpetrated on the per-
son of the [victims]' within the meaning of the second part of
Section 53-21(l)."129 The Supreme Court rejected the state's
argument that recent law had "eliminated the physical touch-
ing requirement" 130 for Section 53-21 that it recognized in its
1980 and 1988 decisions in State v. Pickering1 31 and State v.
Schriver.132 The court in Robert H. reviewed the case law and
statutory changes of the last two decades, but concluded that
the physical touching requirement had not been eroded:
we conclude that in cases concerning alleged sexual miscon-
duct, an "act likely to impair the ... morals of ... [a] child";
CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. To 1997) Section 53-21(1); must
involve a physical touching of the victim's person in a sexu-
al and indecent manner. Likewise, we conclude that an "act
likely to impair the health ... of.. . [a] child"; CONN. GEN.
STAT. Section 53-21(1); when committed in a sexual context,
includes only those acts that involve a direct touching of the
victim's person and are or are likely to be injurious to the vic-
tim's physical health. 133
The Supreme Court in Greene conducted an insufficiency
of the evidence analysis and found that the Appellate Court
had correctly determined that there was insufficient evidence
of the physical touching requirement in CONN. GEN. STAT.
Section 53-21(1). 134
128 Id. at 61.
129 Id. at 63 (quoting in part State v. Robert H., 71 Conn App. 289, 296 (2002)).
130 Id. at 64.
131 180 Conn. 54, 64-65 (1980).
132 207 Conn. 456,465-66 (1988).
133 Robert H., 273 Conn. at 77.
134 The Supreme Court also considered the state's claim that the Appellate Court
had ignored some testimony that the jury may have relied upon in convicting on one
of the three counts. Acknowledging that an insufficiency analysis should focus on
all the evidence, not merely the evidence relied on and referenced by the prosecu-
tion at trial, the court stated: "We also recognize, however, that these principles can-
not be applied in a vacuum. Rather, they must be considered in conjunction with an
equally important doctrine, namely, that the state cannot change the theory of the
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The Supreme Court interpreted and applied a different
mode of liability: the "situation portion" of the risk of injury to
a child statute in State v. Padua]35 and State v. Smith. 136 Under
the "situation portion" of Section 53-21(1), the state need not
prove actual injury to a child but rather that "the defendant
willfully created a situation that posed a risk to the child's
health or morals." 137 In Padua, the Supreme Court found that
the Appellate Court had erred in finding it necessary for the
state to offer expert evidence to prove that oral ingestion of
marijuana would be likely to injure a child. Police executing a
search warrant had found marijuana throughout an apartment,
including some being packaged for sale on the kitchen table
near boxes of cereal, in a household that included the defen-
dants' seven and three year old children.138 In Smith, the police
134 (cont.) case on appeal." Id. at 81-82. The court stated that "'theory of the
case' doctrine is rooted in principles of due process of law." Id. at 82 (citing Dunn
v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1979). The
court cited with approval and adopted a test for theory of the case articulated by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals: "In Cola [v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S. Ct. 398, 93 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1986)], there was evidence
in the record that would have been sufficient to sustain the petitioner's conviction,
but the Court of Appeals held that the state appellate court should not have consid-
ered that evidence in support of the conviction because it was not part of the state's
theory of the case at trial. Id., at 693. In reaching that result the Court of Appeals
interpreted Dunn and its progeny as follows: '
[I]n order for any appellate theory to withstand scrutiny under Dunn, it must
be shown to be not merely before the jury due to an incidental reference, but
as part of a coherent theory of guilt that, upon [review of] the principal
stages of trial, can be characterized as having been presented in a focused
or otherwise cognizable sense.' Id. We conclude that this statement is an
accurate synthesis of Dunn and Chiarella [v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
237 n.21, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 63 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1980)]. We therefore adopt it
as the standard by which to gauge whether evidence introduced at trial, but
not relied on by the state in its legal argument, is properly cognizable by an
appellate court when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence."
Id. at 83.
135 273 Conn. 138, 148 (2005).
136 273 Conn. 204 (2005).
137 Padua, 273 Conn. at 148.
138 Id. at 143-44, 146-64. The Supreme Court sat en banc in Padua. Justices
Borden and Katz wrote dissenting opinions, joined by Justice Norcott. They would
have affirmed the Appellate Court because the "state should have been required to
present expert testimony concerning the possible injurious effects of the oral con-
sumption of raw marijuana." Id. at 187 (Borden, J., dissenting). Justice Katz noted
that the risk of injury to a child statute required the state to prove that the defendants
had created a situation that "was likely to harm the health of a child." Id. at 192
(emphasis in original). Positing that "[c]ommon knowledge is limited ... to those
well substantiated facts that are obvious to the general community[,]" Justice Katz
would have had the court conclude that "the effects of eating raw marijuana are far
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found the defendant semi-conscious on a bed with a small
child sitting nearby, and enough rock cocaine on the mattress
for "six or seven adult doses."'139 Finding that expert testimo-
ny was unnecessary in Smith because a jury possesses the com-
mon knowledge that ingesting cocaine, even in rock form,
would create a risk to a child's health, the Supreme Court
reversed the Appellate Court and ordered that the judgment of
conviction for risk of injury to a child be reinstated.
In State v. Miranda,140 the Supreme Court reversed prece-
dent that it had set in the same case in 1998,141 now conclud-
ing that it had erred when it had then held that the defendant
could be convicted of assault in the first degree for failing to
protect a child from physical abuse by the child's mother. The
case is extraordinary on several grounds,14 2 not the least of
which is the court's recognition that stare decisis should not
bar the court from "reaching a just conclusion in a matter." 143
Six justices joined in a short prefatory opinion that declared:
After careful reconsideration, we have become persuaded
that our conclusion in Miranda I, supra, 245 Conn. 230, that
the defendant could be convicted of assault in the first degree
in violation of Section 53a-59 (a) (3) was clearly wrong and
should be overruled. The six justices of this court who agree
with this conclusion and join in this opinion do not, however,
arrive at that conclusion by employing the same analysis. As
a result, the reasoning of these six justices is set forth in the
two concurring opinions issued herewith. The judgment is
reversed in part and the case is remanded with direction to
dismiss the two counts of the information for assault in the
first degree and for resentencing on the one count of risk of
injury to a child. 144
138 (cont.) from obvious, largely unreported, and, to the extent that they are dis-
cussed outside the mainstream media, they are widely disputed." Id. at 193. Justice
Katz's dissent is notable for its inclusion of citations to zany internet sites that dis-
cuss the properties of raw and cooked marijuana. Id. at 199-200.
139 Smith, 273 Conn. at 206-07.
140 272 Conn 430,431-32 (2005) (per curiam order), 274 Conn. 727, 730, 733-
35 (2005) (full opinion).
141 State v. Miranda ("Miranda I"), 245 Conn. 209 (1998).
142 Both of the plurality opinions cite CONN. GEN. STAT. Section 1-2z, the legis-
lature's riposte to the court's change, announced in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn.
537 (2003), in its approach to the so-called plain meaning rule of statutory interpre-
tation. See State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. at 737-39, 751-52.
143 Miranda, 274 Conn. at 733.
144 Id. at 734-35.
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Justice. Borden, joined by Justices Norcott and Palmer,
wrote that:
the linchpin of the court's reasoning [in Miranda I] was that
there is a recognized common law duty of a parent or legal
guardian to protect his or her child from abuse, the breach of
which may constitute assault under our Penal Code pursuant
to Section 53a-4; and the defendant, although neither a parent
nor legal guardian, was subject to the same duty because he
had established a familial relationship with the victim's
mother, had assumed the responsibility for the victim's car,
and considered himself the victim's stepfather.' 45
Noting that the defendant had never challenged his criminal
liability under the risk of injury to a child statute, Justice
Borden took the position that parents and guardians are in clear
recognizable legal categories that may admit of assault liabili-
ty for failing to act to protect a child, but that "[ilt simply goes
too far to say that [the defendant] should be treated precisely
the same as a parent or legal guardian for purposes of criminal
liability, because he had established a 'familial relationship'
with the victim's mother, had assumed responsibility for the
victim's care, and considered himself her stepfather." 146
Justice Vertefeuille, joined by Chief Justice Sullivan and
Justice Zarella, began her analysis by pointing out that the
court in its 1998 Miranda decision "did not address the text
of the [assault in the first degree] statute or its legislative his-
tory" but instead had focused at length on "'a common-law
duty to protect the victim from her mother's abuse, the breach
of which can be the basis of a conviction under Section 53a-
59(a)(3)." ' 147 Justice Vertefeuille's analysis then employed
the language of the statute, dictionary authority for the com-
monly understood meanings of "assault" and "conduct," leg-
islative history, the rule of lenity, and a critique of the earlier
decision's reliance on authority from other jurisdictions
145 Id. at 747-48.
146 Id. at 749. Justice Borden added that "the emerging demographic trend
toward nontraditional alternative family arrangements, which we cited as support in
Miranda r' now seemed a better "counter argument" because "the boundaries of this
duty-based criminal liability will be too amorphous, and too fact-based and based on
hindsight, to fit comfortably within our Penal Code." Id. He further added that such
amorphousness in determining criminal liability "will discourage others, such as
volunteers and close friends, from establishing 'familial relationships' with the chil-
dren who are likely to be the most in need of them." Id. at 750
147 Id. at 758 (quoting Miranda 1, 245 Conn. at 218).
[Vol. 80212
20061 DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL LAW: 2005 213
interpreting different statutes. 148 Justice Vertefeuille con-
cluded that "the legislature did not intend that inaction, such
as the failure to protect a child, should constitute assault
under this statute." 149  Her view of assault liability would
appear to exclude parents and guardians as well as persons
who do not have a categorical duty to protect a given child.150
Justice Katz in dissent opens her opinion "with the doc-
trine of stare decisis, the principle that cautions courts to
tread lightly into the world of overruling precedent."' 15 1
Justice Katz writes that it is very significant that, in the
seven years since the court's first decision in Miranda, the
legislature did not choose to act to correct the court's statu-
tory interpretation of assault liability. 152 Justice Katz also
questions the "wisdom of revisiting the issue" because it
undermines the value of finality of judgments. 153 Her dis-
sent also recounts the analytic methodology of the Miranda
I decision, replies to various arguments made in the plurali-
ty opinions, and strongly argues that "imposing criminal lia-
bility for omissions is not tantamount to creating a common-
law crime." 154 Justice Katz declares:
148 Id. at 758-66.
149 Id. at 766. Justice Vertefeuille also notes, as did Justice Borden, that the
defendant had never questioned his criminal liability under the risk of injury to a
child statute. Id.
150 Justice Borden differed from Justice Vertefeuille in his methodology and the
scope of his conclusion as to assault liability, though not the result in the case.
Justice Borden stated that he does "not think that the question of whether there can
be criminal liability for a failure to act necessarily can be decided solely by refer-
ence to the language and legislative history of the assault statutes." Id. at 748. It is
mildly ironic that Justice Vertefeuille in her legislative history analysis relies on tes-
timony given by "David Borden, then executive director of the commission to revise
the criminal statutes". Id. at 761. Substantively, Justice Borden differed with
Justice vertefeuille over whether to limit the scope of the decision so as to leave for
dnother day whether a parent or guardian may have a duty that the defendant did not
have in Miranda. Justice Borden wrote:
Although, as Justice Vertefeuille's opinion indicates, a strong case may be
made that our assault statutes preclude any criminal liability based on the
omission of conduct, as opposed to active conduct, a strong case may also be
made that, consistent with the great weight of authority elsewhere, as our
opinion in Miranda I indicated, § 53a-4 would permit this court to recognize
the principle of criminal liability based on the failure to act where there is a
clear legal duty to act, such as where parents or legal guardians are concerned.
Id. at 748.
151 Id. at 768.
152 Id. at 769-72.
153 Id. at 772-74.
154 Id. at 788.
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Therefore, at the risk of repeating myself, I would not adopt
a broad general rule covering other circumstances, but, rather,
I would conclude only that, in accordance with the trial court
findings, when the defendant, who considered himself the
victim's parent, established a familial relationship with the
victim's mother and her children and assumed the role of a
father, he assumed, under the common law, the same legal
duty to protect the victim for the abuse as if he were, in fact,
the victim's guardian. Under these circumstances, to require
the defendant as a matter of law to take affirmative action to
prevent harm to the victim or be criminally responsible
imposes a reasonable duty. 155
VI. MISCELLANEOUS.
Many other cases in 2005 decided issues of importance.
Among them were two decisions of the Supreme Court further
refining the rule set forth in State v. Troupe15 6 for the state's use
of constancy of accusation witnesses to corroborate testimony
by a victim of sexual assault. In State v. Samuels1 57 the Supreme
Court modified the Troupe doctrine so as to limit constancy
testimony to statements made by a complainant before filing
a complaint with the police. 5 8 In State v. Gonzalez,159 the
Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to a
new trial even though two constancy witnesses gave detailed
and graphic testimony in violation of the Troupe rule despite
the fact that defense counsel had obtained an in limine ruling
to enforce the Troupe rule. The Gonzalez court held that the
inadmissible evidence did not prejudice the defendant under
either of the two standards the court has used for "reversing
non-constitutional, evidentiary improprieties." 1 60
Many cases raised issues concerning expert testimony and
155 Id. at 789 (quoting in part State v. Miranda, 245 Conn. at 226-27).
156 237 Conn. 284 (1996).
157 273 Conn. 541, 550-56 (2005).
158 The court in Samuels concluded, however, that the erroneous admission of
testimony by four constancy witnesses was evidentiary, not constitutional, error. Id.
at 556-562. The court concluded that it was not reversible error because it did not
"substantially prejudice the defendant." Id. at 564.
159 272 Conn. 515 (2005).
160 Id. at 527 (discussing one line of cases that requires a showing that "it is
more probable than not that the result of the trial would have been different if the
error had not been committed" and a second line of cases that requires a showing
that "the prejudice resulting from the impropriety was so substantial as to undermine
confidence in the fairness of the verdict.").
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the need for so-called Porter hearings to determine whether
expert testimony was admissible. In State v. Finan,16 1 the
Supreme Court ruled that it was reversible error for the trial
court to permit four police officers to testify regarding their
suspicions that the defendant was the person depicted on a
videotape from a surveillance camera in the convenience store
that the defendant was alleged to have robbed.162 In State v.
Aaron L. 163 the Supreme Court found that a two and a half year
old victim's statement to her mother had properly been admit-
ted in evidence because it satisfied the "residual exception" to
the hearsay rule.164 In Aaron L. Justice Borden wrote a con-
currence in which he declared: "I write separately ... to high-
light the point that, in a future case such as this one, in which
we are asked to apply the residual exception to the hearsay rule
to the statement of a very young child, this court would bene-
fit greatly from some expert learning about how such children
typically recall and relate what happens to them."165
In two cases the courts held that it was not necessary to
hold a Porter166 hearing in order for the state to establish
the validity of expert scientific evidence, in one case on
microscopic hair analysisl 67 and in the other on the horizon-
161 275 Conn. 60 (2005).
162 Noting the evidence connecting the defendant to the robbery was not strong, the
court concluded that "the improper admission of the police officers' testimony likely
affected the verdict and undermined confidence in the fairness of the verdict." Id. at 71.
163 272 Conn. 798 (2005).
164 The trial court had admitted the hearsay evidence under the medical treat-
ment exception to the hearsay rule, not the residual exception. Id. at 808-09. The
Supreme Court noted that the defendant on appeal did not challenge the ability of a
reviewing court to affirm the admission of hearsay "on the basis of an exception to
the hearsay rule other than the one relied on by the trial court." Id. at 810 n.17.
165 Id. at 828. Justice Borden explained further: "Although I am a father and
grandfather, I simply do not know whether what are regarded in the case law as hall-
marks of reliability of young children's statements are valid. Some science may help
to resolve those doubts. I do not think that such material is unavailable.... Perhaps the
next time we are asked to determine whether a statement of a child of such a young
age is reliable enough to be admitted without cross-examination, we will be able to do
so on the basis of more than general notions of experience and our intuition." Id. at 829.
166 The reference is to State v. Porter, 241 Con. 57 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1058 (1998), in which the Supreme Court adopted the federal test for determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), in
preference to the previous test based on Frye v. United States, 294 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). See State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 630 (2005).
167 State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 631-38 (2005) (defendant's challenge to
microscopic hair analysis evidence "is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v.
Reid, [254 Conn. 540 (2000)]." Id. at 631-37.).
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tal gaze nystagmus test, 16 8 because the validity of the under-
lying scientific methodology had previously been established
and affirmed on appeal in other cases, obviating the necessi-
ty of a trial court revisiting the legal issues under Porter. In
another case, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling
under Porter that excluded evidence offered by the defendant
concerning a special protocol for measuring a juvenile's
"competency relative to Miranda warnings."16 9
VII. CONCLUSION
Some important criminal law decisions issued in 2005
have been omitted from this article because it is a survey.
Some areas of criminal law would need much closer analysis
than is fitting here. Certain areas of criminal law will con-
tinue to be featured in the case law. For example, while the
law relating to prosecutorial misconduct claims has been
refined in recent years, practitioners will continue to raise
such claims with a much greater frequency than they did in
the 1990s when the review accorded prosecutorial claims was
comparatively amorphous. Questions relating to scientific
evidence and to expert testimony will need further explo-
ration at both the trial and appellate level in coming years.
Indeed, certain justices of the Supreme Court have voiced an
intellectual hunger for better records upon which to review
claims relating to novel kinds of specialized evidence. The
year 2005 should be remembered for the case, State v. Ross,
that lifted criminal practice into the public arena for intense
debate on the death penalty in modern Connecticut. But 2005
was also a year in which courts and counsel for the state and
the defense dealt with more arcane issues that will affect
criminal practice in 2006 and beyond.
168 State v. Balbi, 89 Conn. App. 567, 576-77, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 919
(2005) (Porter hearing on whether horizontal gaze nystagmus test meets Porter cri-
teria not necessary in light of prior determination that it does in State v. Commins,
83 Conn. App. 496, cert. granted on other grounds, 271 Conn. 905 (2004).
169 State v. Griffin, 273 Conn. 266, 278-82 (2005) (not error to subject "Grisso
protocol" to Porter test; based on record in case no abuse of discretion found in
applying the test. Id. at 86.).
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